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 Philosophical discussions of mechanisms are often contrasted to laws and D-
N explanations. I challenge such contrasts, guided by a reconception of laws and 
necessity first introduced by Marc Lange and John Haugeland, and extended in my 
book, Articulating the World. The underlying moral is to avoid prior philosophical 
conceptions of laws or necessity, and begin with the roles played by lawful 
invariance in scientific practice. Philosophical explications of lawfulness can then 
ask how these roles are played in various sciences.  
 Attributions of lawfulness play at least three important roles in the sciences: 
explanation, inductive projection, and counterfactual reasoning. To avoid the 
persistent shadow of the D-N theory, I focus on induction and counterfactual 
reasoning. Nelson Goodman taught us that some putative conceptual relations are 
inductively projectible; some aren’t. Projectibility is a kind of invariance. A pattern 
evident on one occasion “ought” (rationally) to hold in other cases. Projectibility 
does not concern which patterns are lawfully invariant, but which ones are 
“lawlike,” intelligible candidates for invariance across contexts.  
 Mechanisms are a distinctive kind of projectible pattern that need not be 
verbally expressed. The dynamic, spatio-temporally organized patterns of 
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mechanisms are often explicated by diagrams or models rather than statements. 
Haugeland’s account seems especially appropriate here: instead of talking about 
laws, ceteris paribus clauses, and justification, Haugeland speaks of patterns, 
noise, and pattern-recognition. He aims, however, to understand the modal 
character of these phenomena: the forms of invariance (“necessity”) and normative 
accountability (“salience”, “holding”, and “telling”) that allow for defeasible forms 
of inductive projectibility and conceptual understanding.  
 Lange and Haugeland emphasize scientific understanding in research, 
paralleling the emphasis on discovery in the mechanisms literature. As Lange 
notes, “a basic presupposition of scientific research is that we do not need to 
examine everything in order to know everything. Rather, a few observations, 
restricted in space, time, and other respects, sometimes suffice to render salient a 
hypothesis that is accurate to all unexamined cases in a remarkably wide range of 
cases”. A few observations do not justify accepting that the salient pattern 
continues to hold for unexamined cases; they justify exploring that pattern as 
defeasibly projecting its invariance. Such exploration may articulate and qualify 
the originally discerned pattern. These descendants are nevertheless recognizable 
as further developments of the same pattern. The originally salient pattern was thus 
not yet fully determinate. The mechanisms literature similarly attends to sketchy 
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beginnings, components of a larger, unspecified  mechanism, and so forth. 
 The salience of a pattern is not a psychological propensity to generalize, but 
a normative consideration of how the pattern ought to be manifest elsewhere if it 
were to go on in the same way (note that the subjunctive conditional plays a 
constitutive role here). Judgments of salience admit some disagreement, but most 
possible pattern extensions are ruled out by a default continuation of what is salient 
in context. That default pattern is sensitive to other commitments, and hence can 
shift with further understanding. In Lange’s example, the Boyle-Charles Law and 
the van der Waals Law each saliently extends a pattern of pressure/volume 
relations under different background assumptions. Most inductive extensions of 
those data are not salient or projectible, however. 
 The next point is pivotal. The counterfactual invariance of lawful and 
accidental patterns might seem to differ only in degree. Accidents hold under some 
contingencies, while even acknowledged laws do not hold under all counterfactual 
suppositions. Lange and Haugeland attribute lawful invariance not to patterns 
singly, but only to multiple patterns that collectively compose a lawful domain. 
Lawful patterns have a maximal collective invariance: they hold under any and all 
counterfactual suppositions consistent with a lawfully domain-constitutive group. 
The collective counterfactual invariance of a group of projectible patterns provides 
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an independent criterion for the autonomy of disciplinary domains. Those patterns 
that are collectively interdependent, with each pattern holding under conditions 
that do not violate the others, mark out domains of conceptual intelligibility.  
 This modal holism is crucially shaped by the prospective orientation of 
scientific research. No research field has a complete, inferentially closed set of 
laws. Scientific research instead undertakes inductive strategies to articulate, 
extend, connect and refine the salient patterns they uncover, and thereby advance 
scientific understanding. Pursuing an inductive strategy situates the patterns 
studied within a larger pattern of invariance. The commitment is not to their 
correctness, but to their projectibility. If an initial sketch of a mechanism is a 
projectible pattern, then it is confirmable and revisable by its instances. Further 
instances that go on in the same way genuinely confirm the mechanism, while 
unexpected or unarticulated variations in the pattern provide evidence for revising 
it, the same pattern originally indicated as salient. 
 This prospective autonomy of scientific domains has two importantly 
conjoined aspects: their lawful invariance and their normative accountability 
function together. Different kinds of invariance result from different ranges of 
counterfactual stability. Scientific disciplines should not contravene one another’s 
claims about actual events. They nevertheless differ in ranges of counterfactual 
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invariance or “necessity”. Some biological patterns may hold under counterfactual 
circumstances that would violate the lawfulness of chemistry or physics. For 
example, R. A. Fisher’s evolutionary model shows how sex ratios within a 
population at birth evolve due to different mortality rates before reproductive 
maturity. Selection pressures for more offspring of whichever sex would be under-
represented at reproductive maturity persist until the sex ratios at maturity stabilize 
at 1:1. That adaptive pattern would hold even if the mechanisms of sex 
determination were “impossibly” different, where the latter impossibility is 
physical or chemical rather than biological. 
 The more important point is that domain-specific forms of counterfactual 
invariance are interdependent with that domain’s normative accountability. 
Projectible patterns within a domain must “hold” under any circumstances 
consistent with the other patterns that together constitute a lawful domain. 
Domains nevertheless differ in their standards for whether a pattern does hold. 
They also differ in the skills, materials, and instrumentation needed to tell whether 
the standards were upheld. Consider first how scientific standards of confirmation 
differ in multiple normative dimensions: precision, accuracy, openness to ceteris 
paribus exceptions, and noise tolerance. Mechanisms, for example, only remain 
invariant under a partially specifiable range of background conditions. Moreover, 
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not all counterfactual suppositions are relevant to a scientific domain. Lange notes 
that evolutionary biology is unconcerned with how species would have evolved 
had the moon not broken off from the earth. It likewise makes no difference to 
internal medicine how coronary response to epinephrine would vary had 
mammalian hearts evolved differently. And so forth. 
 When a pattern remains relevantly invariant is also interdependent with 
whether and how scientists can tell if the pattern still holds. Ceteris paribus clauses 
do not render laws vacuous by turning possible counterexamples into confirming 
instances, if scientists can distinguish cases that are legitimately excluded from 
those that aren’t. A similar point applies to the experimental skills and instrumental 
capacities that let a pattern show up in different circumstances. Apparent 
counterexamples to a pattern sometimes instead reveal improper technique or 
preparation, failure to discern different manifestations of the pattern, inadequate 
shielding from interference, or other improper executions of relevant skills. 
Sometimes skills properly accord with past practice, but need improvement to 
allow recognition that a pattern continues to hold. The counterfactual invariance of 
the pattern, the normativity of when it “holds”, and how to tell the difference go 
hand in hand. 
 For Haugeland, these considerations show the interdependence of two 
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different conceptions of intelligible patterns. Traditional accounts of laws treat 
lawful patterns as “orderly or random arrangements—the opposite of chaos” (1998, 
273). On an alternative conception, what identifies a real pattern is expert ability to 
discern it: patterns just are candidates for pattern-recognition. The orderly-
arrangement conception cannot be autonomous, because it presupposes a more 
basic pattern that individuates the elements of that orderly arrangement. The sense 
of patterns and their elements as recognition-candidates also cannot stand on its 
own, however. By themselves, such patterns cannot provide a standard that 
differentiates genuine recognition from its mere semblance.  
 These two senses of pattern correspond to Salmon’s (1984) distinction 
between ontic and epistemic accounts of explanation: does the explanation appeal 
to an actual mechanism operating in the world, or to the scientific representation 
and understanding of the mechanistic pattern? Haugeland shows how scientific 
understanding requires both conceptions together, in maintaining a “precarious 
equilibrium” between two forms of pattern-recognition. Outer recognition shows 
the constitutive, projectible invariance of an intelligible pattern, such as the Krebs 
cycle, or protein synthesis from an RNA template. Inner recognition tells whether a 
new case fits that pattern. The equilibrium between them is precarious in their 
possible conflict. Some ways of performing experiments, applying concepts, and 
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modeling the outcomes—the basic skills of scientific practice--might have 
outcomes in conflict with the pattern being explored, or its relation to other 
patterns in the same domain. The ability to resolve these conflicts coherently is a 
genuine achievement. That ability confers intelligibility upon the patterns, pattern 
elements, and scientific skills that are involved. Maintaining stability (“necessity”) 
in the face of possible counterexamples is criterial for the correct performance of 
the skills that disclose it. Otherwise they would not be skills, but only habits. The 
ability to learn, communicate, use, and correct those skills, with outcomes that 
confirm and refine the pattern, then vindicates in turn its projected lawfulness. 
 Explanatory patterns in the mechanisms literature have a tripartite structure: 
mechanisms explain phenomena, and both are attested or challenged by various 
data. In Haugeland’s terms, both phenomena and the mechanisms that explain 
them are lawful patterns. The data and scientists’ skills at producing, interpreting, 
and assessing their bearing on these patterns are forms of “inner recognition”. The 
distinctions among data, phenomena and explanatory mechanisms are nevertheless 
iterative: reliable and intelligible data are themselves a phenomenon explained by a 
reliably invariant experimental system.  
 Lange and Haugeland emphasize the normative and alethic-modal autonomy 
of scientific domains, and consequently a strong scientific disunity. In Articulating 
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the World, I argue instead that lawful domains are only partially autonomous, in 
ways nicely illustrated by the mechanisms literature. Mechanistic explanations 
work at hierarchical levels, but they also integrate mechanistic organization and 
function across levels, in  “interfield theories” and the occasional emergence of 
new disciplines. The only-partial autonomy of lawful domains reflects the “two-
dimensionality” of conceptual articulation in the sciences. I call the most basic 
dimension homonomic. Development of theoretical modeling and experimental 
systems and skills within a single scientific domain is homonomic. The concepts 
involved are typically first explicated by experimental phenomena that provide 
“well-behaved” settings for working out conceptual relationships and their 
applicability in models. The inductive projectibility of its concepts and models 
then has the kind of holistic interdependence characterized earlier. 
 Homonomic understanding is normally complemented by heteronomic 
development of its concepts, practices and skills. These more tentative and less 
systematic modes or fields of research and interpretation draw upon resources and 
concerns outside their scientific domain. Sometimes they address issues arising in 
one locus with skills, materials, or phenomena developed elsewhere. On other 
occasions, they take up issues at or across domain boundaries. Sometimes they 
coalesce into cross-disciplinary research programs. Over time, these programs may 
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develop into disciplines with their own norms and projectible patterns, as cell 
biology emerged between biochemistry and classical cytology. Heteronomic 
explorations may remain a limited effort, become a persistent interdisciplinary 
trading zone, or lead to a newly autonomous domain. The conceptual open-
endedness of research domains reflects a practical commitment to taking one’s 
concepts as inductively projectible as part of a counterfactually invariant set, but 
one whose full contours are not yet determined.  
 Heteronomic inquiry is thus indispensable to the significance and 
contentfulness of scientific understanding. Significance is also at issue 
homonomically, of course. Heteronomic significance nevertheless distinctively 
contributes to scientific understanding. We care about the internal development 
and articulation of scientific domains because they are not entirely self-contained. 
Whether a science’s conceptual relations display a counterfactually invariant 
pattern in the world (rather than displaying the discipline’s sloppiness, 
inattentiveness, or trivializing self-vindication) is at issue in the ongoing 
development of the field. A discipline’s empirical accountability arises not only 
from its internal ethos, but from heteronomic accountability to other practices and 
concerns. These conceptual patterns are not merely artifactual if they inform issues 
arising elsewhere. 
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 I conclude with Salmon’s distinction of three conceptions of scientific 
explanation: epistemic, modal, and ontic. Advocates of mechanistic explanation 
disagree about whether mechanisms are epistemic or ontic explanations, but they 
mostly repudiate modal conceptions. I instead reconceive alethic modalities as 
integral to scientific understanding in practice. The ontic and epistemic 
conceptions then come together as complementary aspects of a larger modal 
pattern encompassing scientific research along with its objects of study. In 
Articulating the World, this re-conception of scientific understanding in practice is 
part of a naturalistic account of scientific understanding as a form of biological 
niche construction. How mechanistic modeling belongs to that larger story must 
nevertheless be reserved for another occasion. 
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